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In recent years (Prahalad and Hammond 2002) have proposed the idea that large corporations 
might “serve the poor profitably” with the purpose of simultaneously developing markets in 
which the poor reside and reducing poverty in the developing world.  The growing body of 
research in this field of study and practice has been referred to as the “base of the pyramid” (Hart 
and Christensen, 2002), or “inclusive business” (SEKN, forthcoming) in Latin America.   The 
thrust of this work suggests that where development organizations have been largely ineffective 
at reducing poverty among the world’s poor, the private sector may hold the key (SEKN, 
forthcoming).  The following case studies on innovative agribusiness ventures that include low 
income sectors (LIS) may offer new knowledge in the struggle against poverty in Latin America. 
For more than forty years, Mellor and others have pointed out, with convincing data, that 
“agricultural growth and only agricultural growth effectively mitigates poverty in low income 
countries with a substantial agribusiness sector” (Mellor, 1999). Because poverty in developing 
countries is largely rural, any rural income increase has a disproportionate impact on global 
poverty (Economist, 2007).  Agro-industries have created a demand for agricultural sectors to 
produce greater quantities of more diverse crops, and, farming employment has grown as a result 
(Austin, 1992).  These processing industries thus hold a promise to drive agricultural growth and 
rural poverty reduction.  
 
In this paper we examine three case studies on agribusiness ventures that have integrated LIS 
into value creation activities. These cases were developed by INCAE in collaboration with ten 
other Ibero-American business schools and Harvard University as part of the Social Enterprise 
Knowledge Network. The goal for each agribusiness is economic profit, but as we shall see in 
the cases, this does not imply that wealth creation among LIS is a mutually exclusive goal. 
Regardless of underlying motivations, the key questions we explore in this paper are,  
 
How do these agribusiness ventures incorporate LIS into their value chains?  
 
What factors are relevant to explaining the success of each venture? 
 
Which of these factors are common among the three ventures in creating economic and social 
value?  
 
To answer these questions, we shall use the agribusiness chain analytical framework described in 
the following section, which enables us to identify the roles played by LIS in the ventures 
studied. After having described the framework, we shall examine the three cases to understand 
how LIS integration has influenced the structure and performance of each agribusiness system. 
The final section includes a summary discussion of the success factors in each case and presents 
some conclusions in reference to our initial questions.  
 
Analytical Framework for Agribusiness Chains 
 
An agribusiness chain (Austin 1981, 3) includes the raw materials processing stage and any 
upstream and downstream activities. Thus, agribusiness chains include operations spanning from 
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involve the transformation of agricultural products grown on the soil and livestock-derived 
goods. These transformation processes vary widely, from cleaning and packing to chemical 
alterations, but they are all characterized by three features of their raw materials. First, raw 
materials are perishable and cannot be stored for long periods of time, especially fruits and 
vegetables. Second, most harvests are seasonal, while food product demand is usually stable. 
Third, farm product quality is much more variable than that of manufactured products. These 
traits impose logistical and operating challenges for agribusiness management and create 
opportunities as well as barriers for LIS incorporation as business partners.  
  
The challenges of agribusiness coordination were first studied by Davis and Goldberg (1957), 
who developed a framework known as “the agribusiness commodity system,” later applied by 
generations of Harvard Business School students to analyze case studies. In developing nations, 
James E. Austin (1981,1992) demonstrated the analytical prowess of this framework and 
elaborated a protocol to evaluate agribusiness projects. We will use the David and Goldberg 
framework as modified by Austin to examine strategies to integrate the LIS in agribusiness 
ventures as shown in figure 1. 
  
The three major links in the chain identified by (Austin 1992) include: acquisition (field), 
transformation (factory), and trade (market). The first refers to product planting, growing and 
harvesting processes. In the factory link, these agricultural raw materials are transformed, and 
issues associated with end product packaging, storage and transportation to distributors are 
addressed. The market link handles matters relating to the identification of consumer 
preferences, market segmentation, demand forecasting, pricing, the choice of distribution 
channels, advertising and promotion, and marketing management. The tasks involved in each 
link are performed by primary actors –farmers, processors, distributors and other parties directly 
managing products. Support actors in agricultural ministries and financial institutions may 
provide technical assistance, loans and other services, as well as coordination elements that 
enable efficient product flow. Close coordination among field, factory and market links becomes 
crucial due to agribusiness products’ seasonality and perishable nature.   
   
The value of the Austin analytical framework lies in its ability not only to identify value 
activities carried out by each actor in the chain, but also to determine who holds the greatest 
negotiating leverage at each stage and why. Indeed, this framework complements the “five 
forces” industry analysis model introduced by Michael Porter (1980) –competitive pressures 
among rivals, buyers and suppliers, newcomers and substitute good producers, as well as the 
value chain with its primary and supporting activities (Porter 1985).  These models prove useful 
for gaining a better understanding of how LIS integration in agribusiness value chains can create 




Within the field of agricultural management and economics, case study research has a well-
established tradition (Sterns, Schweikhardt, and Peterson 1998).  When used in conjunction with 
a set of well defined objectives, guided by a theoretical framework, the case study methodology 
has a wide range of scholarly applications for analyzing agribusiness models and thereby 
contributing to theory building.  When rigorous protocol is applied to the case study Metzger et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 13, Issue 1, 2010 
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methodology many insights not available from historical time series analysis may also be made 
(Westgren and Zering 1998).  We now turn our attention to the specific cases studied by way of 
introducing each business, the barriers each enterprise encountered implementing their business 
models with the LIS, the practices used to overcome them, and the economic and social value 
created.  
 
Latin American Agribusiness Case Studies in Social Inclusion 
 
Nine of the cases developed in Latin America by the Social Enterprise Knowledge Network 
reveal a range of roles performed by LIS in agribusiness –mostly at the field link, sometimes at 
the processing link, and less frequently in the market. We highlight three of those cases in this 
paper as they typify social inclusion innovations in the critical field link of the agribusiness 
chain, please see Figure 1.   
 
The case of Tierra Fértil includes the LIS as fresh and perishable product suppliers for Central 
American supermarket chains. In the two other cases, Irupana and the Costa Rican 
Entomological Supply (CRES), the LIS also provide perishable produce for downstream 
processing –organic grains received by Irupana from Bolivian farmers are naturally processed, 
while butterfly pupae (the correct term for what are commonly called “cocoons”) delivered to 
CRES by Costa Rica’s breeders are classified, packaged, and exported to exhibitors.  In the case 
of Irupana some farmers become factory employees, doubling their wages as a consequence.  
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The Tierra Fértil Program was created in 1974 by Enrique Uribe, Costa Rican entrepreneur who 
had founded the CSU supermarket chain, in response to increasing customer demand for 
freshness, variety, and hygiene in their purchase of fruits and vegetables. Previously, CSU had 
purchased these items in public markets, where middlemen known as “coyotes” sold produce 
acquired directly from small farmers, whom they typically visited with pickup trucks and 
sometimes negotiated the purchase terms before the crops were harvested.  The farmers often 
accepted low prices in exchange for credit with which to purchase agricultural supplies.  
Tierra Fértil began by introducing safe, hygienic packaging and improving transportation, often 
picking up produce at small farms.  This resulted in a reduction of waste in classification, 
packing, transportation, reception, placement on shelves from 25% to under 5%.  In the 1980s, a 
campaign to promote rational agrochemical use was orchestrated by Tierra Fértil through an 
alliance with a public marketing agency, providing information and training to small farmers 
throughout the country.  The potential for export of fresh and processed products to the United 
States, Canada and Europe prompted CSU to raise its quality, hygiene and service requirements 
even more in the 1990s, so Tierra Fértil worked with small producers to enhance production 
discipline and attention to planting, harvest, storage and transportation details.   
 
As the number of CSU outlets continued to grow, it became harder for the company to manage 
the washing, packing, and storage operations, which required ever greater numbers of employees 
and more space.  The company therefore made the decision to transfer these activities to the 
farmers, providing the machinery and materials.  Farmers who failed to adjust to these 
heightened demands chose to leave the program, though according to a Tierra Fértil technician, 
many later returned because they had become accustomed to the orderly and hygienic processes, 
and “because we are so demanding, they are learning.”  CSU applied a “fair price policy,” 
paying suppliers a price based on the statistical mode of the price paid by the nation’s leading 
wholesale market, CENADA, plus a premium for compliance with the company’s presentation, 
safety, and packaging requirements.  
 
By 2007, Tierra Fértil was providing technical assistance and other kinds of support to more than 
1,600 small and medium-sized vegetable, fruit and grain producers throughout Costa Rica, most 
of whom had no previous access to loans, technology, or markets. Tierra Fértil provided advice 
on what to grow and when, based on CSU’s knowledge of consumer preferences. The program 





Irupana Andean Organic Foods is a Bolivian company dedicated to the purchase and export of 
organic agricultural products cultivated by poor farmers of the Andean, Amazonian and Chaco 
regions of Bolivia.  It was founded in 1987 by Javier Hurtado and his wife Martha Cordero with 
the intent of helping the marginalized poor of rural Bolivia through private business that 
provided the family farmer access to international markets, financial and technical assistance, 
and through “fair trade” initiatives sponsored by NGOs (non-governmental organizations) that 
sought premium prices for quality organic produce. Metzger et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 13, Issue 1, 2010 
 
 2010 International Food and Agribusiness Management Association (IAMA). All rights reserved. 
 
6
When Javier started his new venture, one of his first steps was to identify poor coffee producers 
in the rural communities of the city of Irupana in the Southern Yungas region of Bolivia.  These 
coffee growers possessed farms of less than ¼ hectare and had no access to formal markets, but 
instead relied on informal markets which offered them few incentives to increase volume or 
improve quality.  This changed when Javier’s new company, Irupana, showed interest in 
contracting with them as suppliers and began to export Bolivia’s first 100 percent organic coffee. 
 
Irupana rapidly diversified its product offering and by the 1990s the company was selling 80 
different types of organic products, from Andean cereals, such as quinua, amaranto, cañawa, to 
organic soy, honey, wheat, and a variety of fruits.  Irupana paid its suppliers premiums of up to 
20 percent for product quality, cleanliness, and on-time delivery for these organic products.  In 
time, under these policies and with the provision of technical assistance, Irupana’s supplier 
network expanded to reach over one thousand families.  Irupana’s distributors grew to include 18 
storage facilities and 300 retail stores, as well as large supermarket chains in major Bolivian 
cities such as La Paz, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz. 
 
As Irupana approached the new millennium, the export of organic produce from Bolivia reached 
more than 6,700 metric tons with a value of over $10 million, principally of coffee, quinua, and 
castaña.  With almost half of Irupana’s quinua exports from 1990 to 2000 destined to the 
European market and another 41 percent to the United States, the growing international demand 
for this native Bolivian product was confirmed. 
 
By 2006 Irupana had grown to 150 employees and worked with 1,700 family providers.  The 
economic impact of the business on its providers included premiums of 20 to 25 percent paid to 
rural farmers for quality produce and on-time delivery. The relationship with Irupana represented 
a 50 percent increase in family income for these rural family farmers, which prior to their 
relationship with Irupana was on average $700 per year, and a secure and growing international 
market for fair trade produce. 
     
CRES 
 
Costa Rican Entomological Supply (CRES) was started in 1983 when Joris Brinckerhoff, then a 
Peace Corps volunteer in Costa Rica, was searching for a new venture idea that would contribute 
to the country’s economic development without damaging the ecology, and breeding butterflies 
for export met his criteria.  For seed capital he sold his car in the United States and borrowed 
some money from his family.  An importer and wholesaler from the U.K. visited his installations 
and agreed to take an initial shipment of live pupae for resale to butterfly exhibitors.  Boosted by 
this success, Joris raised an additional $25,000 among relatives and purchased land for a new 
company headquarters in La Guácima, a rural area near the international airport. 
 
During its first year of operations, CRES produced all the pupae that it exported.  In 1986, 
several employees proposed becoming independent, breeding the pupae in their own 
installations, and selling them to CRES.  Joris accepted the proposal, and it was agreed that these 
new breeder-entrepreneurs would be paid a price equivalent to 70% of the export price, then 
$2.40 per unit. The percentage of pupae exports that were acquired from independent breeders 
increased from 1.2% in 1987 to 18.4% in 1990. Metzger et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 13, Issue 1, 2010 
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Word of the opportunity for gain from butterfly breeding spread rapidly in the rural areas of 
Costa Rica, where work was seasonal and few agricultural laborers earned the minimum wage, 
equivalent to $235 per month.  By 2006, over 97% of the pupae exported by CRES were 
obtained from suppliers located throughout the country.  During the rainy season from May 
through November, it was common for breeders to produce between 500 and 600 pupae per 
week whereas in the dry season, production levels of 150-250 pupae per week were more 
common.   
 
For many years, CRES was the only major exporter.  In 1992 a second company entered the 
industry, and in 2003, a third competitor began a professional advertising campaign with a 
message that emphasized environmental protection and concern for their employees and 
suppliers.  In addition, numerous individual buyers such as “Andrés,” “Sergio” and “Luis” were 
beginning to appear in the market, accepting pupae that had been rejected by CRES for cash, at 
giveaway prices.  Costly price wars ensued, with prices collapsing 30% in 2005, but CRES 
recovered the following year due mainly to an increase in the volumes exported to Europe.   
CRES seeks to maintain leadership in the industry through the quality and variety of its products 
and services, permitting the company to set higher prices which, in turn, enabled it to provide 
adequate remuneration to the national network of suppliers that it has built up over the years.  
CRES offers 50 species of butterfly pupae from all microclimates of Costa Rica, where the 
different varieties of food plant needed to support them could be grown.  Unless the client gives 
other instructions, CRES attempts to assemble a shipment that includes 20% of the “premium” 
species (Morpho and Caligo), and no more than 5% for any one of the remaining 25 to 32 
species that are normally included. 
 
Factors Contributing to Successful Inclusion 
 
The many factors contributing to the successful inclusion of LIS by Tierra Fértil, Irupana, and 
CRES may be clustered into three areas.  The first is consistency of the LIS with the 
requirements of the “business model” or way that each agribusiness system is designed to 
produce a profit.  The second is creation by the LIS of competitive advantage over rivals.  The 
third is execution capacity, by which the barriers to successful inclusion are overcome. 
 
Consistency with Business Model Requirements   
 
The inclusion of LIS was consistent with the requirements of each business model.  That of 
CSU-Tierra Fértil is based on operations that create a superior value perceived by customers as 
worthy of higher prices. This supermarket chain caters to upper-middle income customers who 
prefer one-stop shopping and whose diet includes fruits, salads and other healthy foods. Among 
the few ways to stand out among their competitors is to offer, through a program like Tierra 
Fértil, fruits and vegetables with variety and freshness. Additional costs incurred to ensure this 
differentiation include: training for producers, refrigeration, transportation and handling. Higher 
costs are offset not only by higher prices but also by customers’ choice to do all their shopping at 
these supermarkets rather than at competing stores.  
 
Irupana’s business model is based on premium prices that a health and ecology-conscious 
consumer segment is willing to pay for organic products supplied by indigenous farmers in a vast Metzger et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 13, Issue 1, 2010 
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region that encompasses the Andes, Amazonia and Bolivia’s Chaco area. This model differs 
from that of CSU-Tierra Fértil in that Irupana focuses on a consumer segment, in both domestic 
and exports markets that values and is willing to pay a premium for a specific product 
characteristic. 
 
The CRES business model is based on satisfying butterfly exhibitors in Europe and North 
America with on-time deliveries of live pupae, obtained from a network of breeders of butterfly 
pupae, in all micro climates of Costa Rica. The CRES business model also includes 
transformation activities (classification, packing and exports) that are valued by the exhibitor 
clients. It is innovative but replicable, and threatened by the emergence of new competitors.  
In each of these agribusiness chains, LIS are fully involved not only in field operations but in an 
array of activities that include the transformation and, in the case of Irupana, the marketing of 
agribusiness products.  Small farmers have traditionally been excluded from downstream 
activities in the agribusiness chain, separated by intermediaries and, therefore, uninvolved in 
supply, manufacturing and marketing operations. The engagement of small producers in Tierra 
Fértil, Irupana, and CRES business models has enabled their access to greater economic and 
social benefits.  
 
A Source of Competitive Advantage 
 
In the previous section, we examined how the integration of LIS suppliers in the agribusiness 
chains of Tierra Fértil, Irupana, and CRES was consistent with the business model of each 
company.  These case studies also reveal that LIS inclusion has effectively contributed to the 
competitive advantage of the respective agribusiness systems, creating win-win situations for the 
LIS and the commercial firms.  
 
The Tierra Fértil program was built in Costa Rica as a result of competitive pressures that fueled 
the need for a the CSU supermarket chain to ensure an ongoing supply of fresh produce to outdo 
competitors on superior quality, freshness, assortment, hygiene and safety. LIS integration in the 
system was essential, as produce variety was only attainable through the acquisition of produce 
from regions with diverse weather conditions and geographically dispersed small farmers. 
However, variety in itself is not a source of competitive advantage –it may be purchased in the 
wholesale market. A true competitive advantage comes from providing a combination of 
attributes sought by customers. This combination is hard to imitate because it requires 
investments in training and forging long-term relationships with LIS. 
 
CRES, like Tierra Fértil, introduced a new business model that favored the incorporation of a 
LIS producers’ network. Butterfly exhibitors’ demand for a greater variety of species drove this 
agribusiness to recruit independent breeders from diverse microclimates throughout Costa Rica. 
Yet, in contrast to the settings where large retail chains like CSU operate, entry barriers in the 
butterfly farming business are low, and new competitors were able to imitate the CRES model. 
Now, CRES has focused its efforts on providing customers with detailed information on the 
geographies and microclimates where its pupae originate. This requires a close collaboration 
with suppliers who report these data on a continuing basis. 
Irupana, a pioneer in organic product manufacture and marketing that has been broadly 
recognized by organizations such as the World Economic Forum, has pursued a high Metzger et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 13, Issue 1, 2010 
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segmentation strategy to concentrate on a market niche, offering a wide assortment of organic 
food products to a narrow segment of European and American customers. These products are 
elaborated with crops such as highly nutritious quinoa, amaranth, cañawa, soy, wheat and a 
variety of fruits grown by indigenous farmers in the Andes, Amazonia and Bolivia’s Chaco 
regions. In a market dominated by large single-crop plantations, many subsidized by their 
government, Irupana targets a niche of consumers who are willing to pay premium prices for 
organic products with positive social and environmental impact.  
 
Irupana´s large assortment of organic crops is made possible by means of an extensive LIS 
supplier network in eastern Bolivia, where land is least suitable for mechanized farming. Several 
governments have tried to promote farming in these mountainous, rocky regions to no avail. In 
fact, the lack or deficiency of natural or basic resources that prevents large scale industrial 
farming acts as a deterrent for competition, creating an opportunity for Irupana and its organic 
food business. As in the case of Tierra Fértil, this mountainous terrain turned into an advantage 
for the production of a vast variety of crops as a result of diverse microclimates. Indigenous 
farmers’ physical dispersion, as well as their ancient natural farming techniques, has become a 
source of competitive advantage for Irupana’s market segment of choice –European and 
American consumers who are concerned about their health, environmental sustainability and 
native culture preservation.  
 
By connecting Bolivia’s indigenous communities to market segments demanding broad lines of 
organic products, Irupana has effectively improved farmers’ living conditions while preserving 
their cultural heritage and their traditional crops, while at the same time, avoiding negative 
environmental impacts. Thus, it has transformed many poor Bolivian farmers, formerly 
dependent on charity from governments and development agencies, into micro-entrepreneurs.   
In each of these cases, LIS involvement made possible the preferred access to resources that gave 
competitive advantage to the commercial enterprise.  Moreover, this competitive advantage may 
be sustainable over time, because competitors are held back by an investment asymmetry: they 
would incur higher costs if they tried to imitate the leader since those same resources cannot be 
so easily accessed once the network has been established  (Ghemawat 1986).  
 
Execution Capacity: Overcoming Barriers to Social Inclusion 
 
The three case studies describe formidable barriers to LIS inclusion, among them logistical 
barriers that are especially severe in the field link, lack of organization among small producers, 
scant technical knowledge required for growing quality farm products, and cultural distance that 
hindered the formation of relationships with commercial enterprises.  These barriers were 
overcome by targeted investments in infrastructure, alliances for technical training, initiatives for 
building trust, and premium pricing. 
 
Targeted investments.  Effective resource allocation is a powerful key to execution (Ickis, 1997).  
The Tierra Fértil and Irupana cases demonstrates that even in the face of immovable physical 
barriers or infrastructure deficiencies that cannot be remedied with available resources, logistics 
can be enhanced and transaction costs reduced with modest investments in storage and 
technology centers. It is worth noting that Nestlé, the world’s largest dairy product manufacturer, 
has developed a targeted investment strategy to overcome logistical barriers by building “dairy Metzger et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 13, Issue 1, 2010 
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districts,” where the company invests in milk collection and refrigeration centers for small dairy 
farmers’ production, which is later shipped to processing plants (Goldberg and Herman, 2007).   
Even for CRES, in a small country with an extensive road network, the installation of pick-up 
points for butterfly pupae on the outskirts of the capital greatly facilitated delivery for breeders. 
 
Alliances for technical training.  To overcome capability and qualification barriers, all three 
companies developed support programs intended to improve farmers’ technical readiness and 
education, often through formal or informal alliances with other actors. The provision of 
technical training was the original purpose why CSU initiated the Tierra Fértil program.  It was a 
major feature of Tierra Fértil, beginning with instruction on packing for delivery and gradually 
broadening to include the proper use of agrochemicals and environmentally safe practices.  
Rather than creating its own program, Irupana formed a partnership with an NGO, Prorural, to 
overcome poorly educated and technically unprepared suppliers through the provision of 
technical assistance, production process supervision and harvest planning.  CRES benefitted 
from the efforts of InBio, another NGO, to encourage and train underemployed agricultural 
workers and their families in butterfly breeding. 
 
Initiatives for building trust.  Overcoming cultural distance starts with a dialog between 
producers and companies, sometimes aided by an NGO –as the Prorural did with Irupana.  In the 
Tierra Fértil program, cultural differences with potential suppliers were overcome by hiring a 
new type of buyer, who had the market and agricultural knowledge to advise LIS producers 
throughout the farming process and who also possessed the ability to relate to small farmers and 
a disposition to go out into the field.  Irupana´s partner, Prorural, facilitated dialog sessions with 
the organic farmers, and CRES founder Joris Brinckerhoff held regular workshops with his 
butterfly breeders. 
 
Premium pricing.  The cultural differences between company managers and LIS were generally 
addressed with greater contact and dialog among individuals. It is harder to deal with issues of 
distrust, often compounded by different values associated with notions such as time, manual 
work, interpersonal relationships, laws and loyalties (Sathe, 1985). A practice employed to build 
trust and proximity with LIS farmers was the introduction of pricing policies that reward growers 
for quality. Tierra Fértil paid premium prices for quality.  CRES promoted a policy known as 
“fair pricing” among its suppliers and overseas customers, a policy that it sought to sustain even 
as world prices for butterfly pupae were falling.  To offset this unfavorable market trend, the 
company changed its sales policy, offering customers 30% more pupae at the same price, 
increasing purchase volumes and maintaining overall revenues for butterfly breeders.  
Additionally, CRES tried to differentiate its supply with an optimum mix in an effort to 
safeguard higher market prices. Irupana’s business model also featured a premium pricing 
practice. The company paid providers a 20% premium to reward product quality and on-time 
delivery. This enabled farmers to increase their income while enjoying recognition for their 
efforts. 
 
Integration of LIS and Social Change 
 
The practices used to overcome barriers to LIS involvement described in the previous section 
have often produced changes in the structure of the agribusiness chains, introducing support Metzger et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 13, Issue 1, 2010 
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organizations and other new actors through social program ventures as shown in Figure 1.  
Intermediaries and other actors that hindered integration of the LIS in agribusiness chains were 
eliminated.  These changes go beyond alterations in the structure of the commercial system.  In 
all three cases, they have resulted in the formation of networks of extended business value chains 
and their supporting actors, and changes in the relationships among those actors, as informal 
markets are replaced by contracts. Relationships built on these ecosystems are hard to replicate 
by competitors, creating competitive advantages for the firm and social value for the LIS. Such 
changes do not occur without resistance; they must be managed.  
 
An example of social change management may be seen in the Tierra Fértil program. At the time 
of its inception, the Costa Rican fruit and vegetable industry featured the presence of 
intermediaries, known as “coyotes,” who bought and resold products in traditional markets or 
fairs. The company initially participated in this agribusiness chain, purchasing products for 
supermarket distribution through these traditional channels. The structure of the agribusiness 
chain was altered by the arrival of new actors – NGOs that provided support, training, pricing 
information, and technical assistance to LIS farmers. At the same time, Tierra Fértil reached out 
to producers, buying directly from them and eliminating two links in the chain –coyotes and 
wholesalers. 
 
The agribusiness chain for fruits and vegetables in the Bolivian altiplano, in which Irupana 
participated, underwent a similar structural change. The original chain was characterized by 
many dispersed, isolated LIS farmers at risk of exploitation by intermediaries. The structure 
changed with the arrival of Prorural, which, in addition to training and technical support, offered 
financial and organizational assistance. As a result, Irupana was able to access the producers 
directly, achieving greater efficiency with benefits for both the company and the LIS.  
 
Whereas Tierra Fértil and Irupana changed the structure of existing agribusiness chains, CRES 
created a new chain for the breeding and export of butterfly pupae. Many of the current breeders 
used to be occasional farm laborers or worked in their homes.  One woman, interviewed by 
Italian national television, described how she had begun breeding butterflies and how her 
husband sitting beside her in the interview, quit his job and joined her to make more money. 
With the exports of pupae to North American and European butterfly exhibitors, a new business 
emerged, bringing a new opportunity for LIS in rural Costa Rica. Many of these rural 
entrepreneurs have started new businesses as butterfly exhibitors or producers of framed 
butterflies for tourists.  
 
In all these cases, there was a change in the structure or relationships among actors in the 
agribusiness chains that favored the LIS, moving them from geographical, economic, and 
cultural isolation to fuller participation.  This has constituted social change.  
These cases also illustrate the key role played by supporting agents –crucial elements in the 
Austin analytical framework that we have applied to the cases. These support agents include 
NGOs that work in areas such as technical assistance, training and credit in order to promote and 
facilitate LIS involvement in the agribusiness chain.   
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We can now return to the questions posed in the introduction to this study. How do these market-
based initiatives incorporate LIS in their value chains?  First, they have developed business 
models that are consistent with the roles played by LIS in the agribusiness value chain, but 
required the LIS to further integrate into the value chain through actively building closer 
relationships, rather than further marginalizing them through middlemen.  Transforming LIS 
from “indirect suppliers” into “direct vendors” with no intermediaries in agribusiness chains is a 
departure from traditional agribusiness operations. 
  
Second, what factors were relevant in explaining the success of each venture?  Each commercial 
enterprise designed a business model that was consistent with LIS incorporation, each 
agribusiness chain built one or more sources of competitive advantage, and each company in 
partnership with other actors in the agribusiness chain developed a collective capacity that was 
effective in overcoming barriers to execution. 
 
Third, these same factors were common to all three ventures: a well-designed business model, a 
competitive agribusiness chain in which commercial enterprise and LIS both added and captured 
economic value, and the creation of execution capacity that helped ensure the sustained success 
of the effort.  Non-economic value was created through the emergence of social networks. 
Integration of the LIS, then, is accompanied by changes in ecosystems though the growth of 
complex social networks, ranging from the involvement of new actors, such as Prorural or InBio, 
to the elimination of supply chain links.  If these changes are not purposeful, competitive 
advantages will unlikely arise.  The cases suggest that the integration of LIS in agribusiness 
chains is precisely an ecosystem shift towards greater physical and social proximity as well as a 
new opportunity to capture shared value. 
 
We believe that LIS inclusion in agribusiness value chains may contribute to building 
competitive advantage and economic value for the firm and the LIS, and non-economic value 
that will benefit society.  This is both the most meaningful and boldest conclusion drawn from 
our study.  We do, however, offer one caveat: greater LIS inclusion in agribusiness value chains 





This article relies heavily on the findings of the Social Enterprise Knowledge Network (SEKN).  
From 2004 to 2009, SEKN analyzed the management practices of 30 successful social 
enterprises in Spain and Latin America. Researchers interviewed hundreds of people, and also 
reviewed company documents and secondary sources.  SEKN was established in 2001 by leading 
Latin American business schools, the Harvard University Graduate School of Business 
Administration, and the Avina Foundation. Its research focuses on high-priority areas in the field 
of social enterprise. Members select a single research topic, design a set of common research 
questions and methods, and then conduct field-based research.  Researchers in each participating 
country examine in depth at least four cases of social enterprise in the chosen topic area. The 
findings from each country allow researchers to make comparisons across countries. Harvard Metzger et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 13, Issue 1, 2010 
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